Valuing mortality reductions in India : a study of compensating wage differentials by Simon, Nathalie B. et al.
WPS-2078
Valuing Mortality Reductions in India
A Study of Compensating Wage Differentials
by Nathalie B. Simon, Maureen L. Cropper
Anna Alberini, and Seema Arora
January 1999
Nathalie B. Simon is an economist at USEPA. Maureen L. Cropper is a principal
economist at the World Bank (DECRG). Anna Alberini is an assistant professor at the
University of Colorado and Seema Arora is an assistant professor at Vanderbilt
University.
The findings,  interpretations,  and conclusions  expressed  in this paper  are entirely  those  of the
authors. They  do not  necessarily  represent  the  view of the  World  Bank,  its Executive  Directors,  or

















































































































dValuing Mortality Reductions in India
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I.  Introduction
Conducting benefit-cost analyses of health and safety regulations requires placing
a dollar value on reductions in health risks, including risk of death.  In the United States,
mortality risks are often valued using compensating wage differentials (Viscusi, 1992 and
1993; Viscusi and Moore, 1989; Moore and Viscusi, 1988). These differentials measure
what a worker would have to be paid to accept a small increase in his risk of dying, or,
equivalently, what the worker would pay to achieve a small reduction in his risk of death.
These values, estimated from observed labor market data and converted to Values of a
Statistical Life (VSL), are used to value reductions in risk of death achieved by industrial
safety programs or environmental health programs (USEPA, 1997; Bayless, 1982).1
Although there is an extensive literature on compensating wage differentials in
the U.S., very few studies of compensating wage differentials exist in developing
countries.  In the absence of these studies, policy makers often value improvements in life
' The Value of a Statistical Life is the value of a risk reduction divided by the size
of the risk reduction:
VSL  Value..of.-Ar
Ar
1expectancy using foregone earnings.  That is, the value of an improvement in life
expectancy is measured by the income that would be earned during the individual's
additional productive lifetime.  It is well known that valuing mortality risks using
earnings--the so-called human capital approach--is likely to understate what people
themselves would pay for small risk changes. Indeed, U.S. data suggest that the amount
people would pay for risk reductions based on compensating wage differentials is from 8
to 23 times the value of the risk reductions as estimated by the human capital approach
(Viscusi, 1993).
One way to estimate a VSL for developing countries without conducting original
studies is to extrapolate VSL estimates to these countries from the U.S.  For example, one
could inflate the foregone earnings of an Indian worker by the ratio of the VSL to
foregone earnings computed from a study in the U.S.  This assumes, however, identical
attitudes toward risk in the two countries and an income elasticity of willingness to pay
(WTP) for risk reductions equal to one. 2 Without independent studies of the VSL in
developing countries, such assumptions are difficult to justify.
We attempt to shed light on this issue by conducting a compensating wage study
in one developing country-India-to  obtain estimates of the VSL that reflect Indian risk
preferences.  We then compare the ratio of the VSL to the present value of foregone
earnings in India with ratios obtained in similar studies conducted in the U.S. and
2 These points are discussed more fully in Section II.
2elsewhere.  This allows us to evaluate the benefits-transfer methodology discussed above,
using India as an example.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section II, we discuss the
theory of compensating wage differentials and the theoretical basis for the benefits-
transfer methodology discussed above.  Section III reviews selected studies in the
compensating wage literature, including those for developing countries.  Section IV
describes the methodology and data we use to estimate the Indian compensating wage
differentials.  Section V presents our results, compares them to those obtained in the U.S.
and examines the implications for benefits transfer.  Section VI concludes.
II.  Compensating Wage Differentials and Benefits-Transfer
A.  An Hedonic Model of the Labor Market
The basic idea behind compensating wage differentials is that jobs can be
characterized by various attributes, including risk of accidental death.  Workers are
described by the amount they require as compensation for different risk levels, while
firms are characterized by the amounts they are willing to offer workers to accept
different risk levels.  The matching of wage offers and acceptances determines the
hedonic wage equation, which describes the compensation received for bearing risk in
market equilibrium.
One way to express the individual's willingness  to substitute risk for income in
the labor market is to ask how much compensation he would require to work at various
3risk levels, holding utility constant.  This compensation is the amount C that is given
implicitly by
(1- p)(1 - r)U(C + I) = k  (1)
where r is the risk of death on the job, p is the risk of dying from all other causes and I
represents non-wage income.  The compensation function C(r) is pictured in Figure 1 for
different workers.  The worker's choice of risk level, r, occurs where a marginal change
in required compensation, C'(r), equals a marginal change in the wage offered in market
equilibrium, w'(r), or, equivalently, where the compensation function is tangent to the
hedonic wage equation, w(r).
From the firm's perspective, wage offers that keep profits constant at various risk
levels are given by offer curves PP in Figure 1. Equilibrium in the labor market is given
by the locus of tangency points between various required compensation and offer curves.
This locus is the hedonic wage function, and its derivative with respect to risk of death
measures the value of a small change in risk to the worker:
dw  (1- p)U(w + I)  VSL  (2)
dr  (1- p)(l - r)U'(w+  I)
The rate at which a worker is willing to substitute income for risk is his expected
utility if he survives risk of death on the job, (1-p)U'(w+I), divided by his expected
marginal utility of income, (l-p)(1-r)U'(w+I).  VSL, as we label the relationship, is
increasing in risk, indicating that, ceteris paribus, individuals facing higher baseline risk
should be willing to pay more for a change in risk of a given magnitude. Representing
4Figure  1:  Equilibrium  in an Hedonic Labor  Market
Wage  w(r)






5income by  Y  _ w + I,  we examine the relationship between the value of a risk change
(VSL) and (foregone) income, which forms the basis for benefits transfer.
B.  Benefits-Transfer Using Ratios of VSL to Foregone Earnings
If we assume that individuals in two different countries, say A and B, have the
same preferences (i.e., have the same utility function), then we can assume that, ceteris
paribus, the ratio of VSL to foregone earnings is the same in both A and B, or:
VSLA  VSLB  (3)
yA  yB
where Y equals the present value of foregone earnings. In this case, transferring estimates
of VSL from country A to country B is a simple matter.  One can either multiply yB  by
the ratio (VSLA/YA)  or multiply VSLA by the ratio (yB/yA). 3
This benefits transfer methodology is valid, however, only if the ratio (VSL/Y) is
independent of income.  This is equivalent to assuming that the VSL increases in strict
proportion to income, i.e., that the income elasticity of the VSL is equal to  1. If, on the
other hand, the VSL increases less than in proportion to income (if the income elasticity
is less than one), transferring VSL estimates from a richer to a poorer country will under-
estimate the VSL for the poorer country.
Of course, the above discussion assumes that individuals' preferences, and hence
the utility functions faced by individuals in both countries, are identical.  If they were to
3 The former method, multiplying VSLB  by the ratio of VSLA/YA,  avoids the use
of exchange rates and thus provides more stable estimates.
6vary across countries, conditions for benefits transfer would become even more
restrictive.  This underscores the importance of conducting compensating wage studies to
estimate the VSL in developing countries.
III.  Review  of Labor Market  Studies
A. Compensating  Wage Studies  in Developed  Countries
Although the notion that workers will be compensated for unpleasant conditions
in the workplace dates back to at least Adam Smith (1776), the modem theory of
compensating wage differentials is usually attributed to Richard Thaler and Sherwin
Rosen (1976).  Thaler and Rosen suggested that the labor market could be viewed as an
example of an hedonic market-a  market in which the price of a product (in this case, a
job) varies with its attributes.
In the two decades since Thaler and Rosen's pioneering work, there have been
literally dozens of studies that have estimated hedonic wage equations.  Hedonic wage
equations have been estimated for various segments of the U.S. labor market, including
unionized industries, blue-collar workers, and males.  Similar studies have been
conducted in the United Kingdom (Marin and Psacharopoulous, 1982), Australia, Japan
(Knieser and Leeth, 1991), and Canada (Cousineau et al., 1992).
While the earliest of these studies used average wage data across industries
(Smith, 1974), later contributions focused on data for the individual  worker.  In a typical
study the wage received by worker  i  is explained as a function of his productivity
(measured by education, experience, job tenure) and job attributes.  Whenever possible,
7the data are measured for the individual; however, risk of accidental death or injury is
usually measured for the industry in which the individual works. 4 Typically, the risk data
used in these studies are reported for two-digit industrial classifications, although recent
studies in the U.S. use risk data reported at the one-digit industry level by state (Viscusi
and Moore,  1989; Moore and Viscusi, 1988, 1990a and 1990b; Knieser and Leeth, 1991).
In addition to including risk of accidental death, it is important that the hedonic
wage equation include job attributes that might be correlated with risk of death on the
job.  This includes risk of non-fatal injury, as well as dummy variables for the worker's
occupation and the industry, to capture non-pecuniary job attributes that are difficult to
measure directly.
Several studies have shown, however, that, even after controlling for individual
and job characteristics including risk of death and injury, equally skilled workers are able
to command higher wages in some industries than in others (Krueger and Summers,
1988; Katz, 1986).  The explanation generally offered for these persistent inter-industry
differentials is that some firms are simply willing to pay higher wages-perhaps  to avoid
strikes, labor turn-over, etc.-and  find that paying these higher wages is consistent with
maximizing profit.  This underscores the importance of controlling for inter-industry
wage differentials in measuring the premium attached to fatal and nonfatal job risks.
4Several  studies (Gegax, De Haan, and Schulze, 1991; Gerking and De Haan, and
Schulze, 1988; Shanmugam, 1997) have used the individual's subjective estimate of his
or her own risk as the measure of risk.  The correlation between perceived and actual risk,
however, was generally low in spite of the fact that risk so defined was a significant
predictor of wage.
8B.  Compensating Wage Studies in Developing Countries
In spite of the large number of compensating wage studies completed in
developed countries, very few have been completed in developing countries.  However,
in a recent study for Taiwan, a newly industrialized economy, Liu et al. (1997) find
evidence of compensating wage differentials using data from labor market surveys for
years 1982 to  1986. The implied VSL stemming from their work ranges between
US $413,000 and US $461,000 with a ratio of VSL to the present value of foregone
earnings between 7 and 8.
Only one other study that we know of has been conducted in a developing
country-Shanmugam's  work in India (1997).  Unlike our study, however, Shanmugam's
study focuses on a single metropolitan area in India--the Madras District in the state of
Tamil Nadu--rather than looking at the country as a whole.  Using 522 observations
collected from blue-collar, male workers including wage, worker characteristics and
perceptions of job risk, Shanmugam finds evidence of compensating wage differentials
using injury data collected at the two-digit level (Indian Industrial Classification) as the
risk measure.  The implied value of a statistical life comes to Rs. 12.084 million, or
approximately US $400,000.
Looking at the ratio of VSL to the present value of foregone earnings, however,
Shanmugam's figures seem exceptionally high.  The ratio of his VSL to foregone
earnings is 73, 10 times higher than that obtained by Liu et al. for Taiwan and between 5
to 13 times higher than that obtained by Moore and Viscusi for the U.S. (1988).  It could
be that by focusing on only one metropolitan area, his estimate of VSL, and hence the
9ratio of VSL to foregone earnings, is not representative of that for the country as a whole.
We remedy this in our study by using labor market data for the entire country.
IV.  Methodology
We estimate an hedonic wage equation for Indian manufacturing industry using
grouped data for 1,454 occupation/industry cells.  The hedonic wage equation takes the
following form,
Inwe  = ao  +ajr  + ,q5Di  +Xii  ++FIZ  (4)
i=1
where  wy represents the average daily wage in occupation  i  and  industry j, rj is the
risk of fatal injury in industry j, and the {Di} are occupation dummies. The vector  Xy
includes characteristics that vary by occupation and industry, such as the proportion of
men in the occupation/industry cell, while Zj  includes industry-specific data such as
average firm size, region in which the industry is concentrated, and risk of non-fatal
injury.  Since we use grouped data, we estimate the model using weighted least squares,
where the weights are the number of workers in a given occupation-industry cell. The
data used to estimate the above equation are described in more detail below.
A. Data Description
Data on the average daily wage earned by workers in occupation  i  and industry j
are from the Occupational Wage Survey (OWS), conducted by the Indian Labour Bureau.
The OWS is administered periodically to a random sample of registered factories in
10selected industries. 5 Industries are included in the OWS if they belong to the organized
(i.e. unionized) sector, employ a "large" number of individuals and if they are considered
to be "important" to the Indian Industrial Economy (OWS, 1994). Given that unions play
a potentially large role in informing their members of job-related risks, it makes sense to
focus on this sector of the Indian labor force.  The Fourth Round of the OWS, conducted
between 1985 and 1991, provides the most recent, completed survey available. It
compiles information for a total of 53 three-digit industries, listed in Table 1.  While the
OWS provides information for some plantation industries and mining, we limit the
analysis to manufacturing only.
The OWS reports the average daily wage for full-time, manual workers,
by occupation, for the industries listed in Table 1.6 In addition to wage information, the
OWS provides other pertinent information at the occupation level within each industry,
including a detailed description of the work performed, the number of workers employed,
the proportion of men, the number of time-rated (vs. piece-rated) workers, cost-of-living
allowance, over-time allowance and shift allowance. Table 2 lists the occupations that
occur most frequently in the data.  The OWS also provides some information for each
All factories employing 20 or more persons (10 or more if power is used) are
required to register with the relevant state government. In addition, each state has the
authority to extend the registration requirement to any factory regardless of size provided
that, if the operation is family-owned, at least one employee is hired from outside the
family.
6 Because the OWS data took several years to collect, all wage and other
monetary data are reported in constant (1990) rupees.
11Table  1:  Manufacturing  Industries
Included  in Fourth  Round of the Occupational  Wage Survey
2-digit  IIC  3-digit  IIC  Industry  Name
201  Manufacture of Milk and Ice Cream Powder, Condensed and Bottled Milk, and
Baby  Milk  Foods
20&21:  Food and  206  Manufacture and Refining of Sugar (Vacuum Pan Sugar Factories)
Food  Products  207  Manufacture of Khandsari Sugar
210  Manufacture of Hydrogenated Oils, Vanaspati Ghee, etc.
212  Tea Processing
214  Cashewnut Shelling, Processing and Packing
22:  Beverages,  224  Soft Drinks and Carbonated Water Industries
Tobacco  and  Related  227  Manufacture of Cigarette and Cigarette Tobacco
Products
23: Cotton Textiles  231  Cotton Spinning, Weaving, Finishing
24: Wool, Silk and  241  Wool Spinning, Weaving and Finishing in Mills
Man-Made  Fibre  245  Spinning, Weaving and Finishing of Silk Textiles
Textiles  247  Spinning, Weaving & Finishing of Other Textiles, Synthetic Fibres
25: Jute  251  Jute and Mesta Spinning and Weaving
26: Textile  Products  264  Manufacture of All Types of Textile Garments including Wearing Apparel
28: Paper  & Paper  280  Manufacture of Paper, Newsprint and Packing Paper (Machine Made)
Products  & Printing,  284/285  Printing and Publishing of Newspapers, Periodicals, Books, Journals, Maps, etc.
Publishing,  etc.
29: Leather and  291  Manufacture of Footwear (excl. Repair) Except Vulcanized, Moulded Rubber,
Leather  Products  Plastic Footwear
30: Basic Chemicals  300  Manufacture of Tyres and Tubes
&Chemical  Products  304  Petroleum Refineries
310  Manufacture of Basic Industrial Organic, Inorganic Chemicals and Gases
31: Rubber, Plastic,  311  Manufacture of Fertilizers (Inorganic, Organic and Mixed)
Petroleum  and Coal  313  Manufacture of Drugs and Medicines
314  Manufacture of Toilet Soap, Washing Soap and Soap Powder
317  Manufacture of Matches
32:  Non-Metallic  321  Manufacture of Glass and Glass Products
Mineral  Products  324  Manufacture of Cement
33:  Basic Metal  and  330  Iron and Steel Industries
Alloys  331  Manufacture of Castings and Forgings (Ferrous)
335  Aluminum Manufacturing Industries
350  Manufacture of Agricultural Machinery and Equipment and Parts
352  Manufacture of Prime Movers, Boilers and Steam Generating Plants and Parts
353  Manufacture of Textile Machinery and Jute Machinery
35/36:  Machinery  355  Manufacture of Refrigerators and Air Conditioners
and Equipment Other  357  Manufacture of Machine Tools, their Parts and Accessories
than Transport  360  Manufacture of Electrical Industrial Machinery and Apparatus and Parts
Equipment  363  Manufacture of Electrical Apparatus, Appliances and Other Parts Exel. Repair
364  Manufacture of Television Sets and Teleprinters
366  Manufacture of Electronic Computers, Components and Control Instruments
and Accessories
370  Ship Building and Repairing
371/372  Manufacture of Locomotives, Railway Wagons and Coaches and Parts
374  Manufacture of Motor Vehicles and Parts
Equipment  and  Parts  375  Manufacture of Motorcycles and Scooters and Parts
376  Manufacture of Bicycles, Cycle Rickshaws and Parts
377  Manufacture of Aircrafts and Parts
38: Other  382  Manufacture of Watches and Clocks
IIC=lndian  Industrial  Classification
12Table 2:  Occupations Appearing in 10 or more OWS Industries






























Charge Hand  11
Furnace Man  11
Loader/Unloader  11
Wire Man  11
Crane Driver  10
13three-digit industry, including average firm size and the concentration of the industry
within geographic regions.
We supplement the OWS data with data collected and reported in the Annual
Survey of Industries (ASI).  These data include value added per worker, number of
employees in government-operated (vs. privately-owned) factories and the turnover rate
in each industry.  These data are reported at the two-digit industry level, except for value
added per worker, which is reported at the three-digit level.  To measure on-the-job risk,
we use the rate of fatal injuries in the industry and the rate of non-fatal injuries in the
industry, obtained from various volumes of the Indian Labour Yearbook. Descriptive
statistics and definitions for all of the variables used are provided in Table 3.  The
average annual wage rate for Indian manufacturing workers is Rs. 20,054 (1990
Rupees). 7 In general, risk of death on the job is somewhat higher in India than in
the U.S.  In India, approximately 15 workers per 100,000 die on the job compared to only
8 per 100,000 in the U.S. (Moore and Viscusi, 1988).8
B.  Regression Analysis
Using the data described above, we estimated several different specifications of
the hedonic wage equation. These vary in the number of explanatory variables included
in the model, and in the definition of the risk variables.
7 The average annual wage was calculated assuming a 300-day work-year.
8 Indian job-related fatality rates are reported per 10,000 man-days. Rates per
100,000 worker are calculated assuming a 300-day work-year.
14Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics
Variable  Level of  Standard
Name  Variable Definition  Observation  Mean  Deviation
Wage  Annual Wage* (1990 Rupees)  3-digit industry/  20054.01  8815.48
occupation
Fatal  Number of fatal injuries/ 100,000  2-digit industry  0.149  0.086
workers, from previous period
Nonfatal  Number of non-fatal injuries/  2-digit industry  38.942  42.493
100,000 workers, from previous
period
Workers  Number of workers in occupation  3-digit industry/  3505.37  9827.39
occupation
Time  Proportion of time-rated workers  3-digit industry/  89.258  28.461
occupation
Overtime  =1 if overtime is paid  3-digit industry/  0.711  0.453
occupation
Shift  =1 if shift allowance paid  3-digit industry/  0.569  0.495
occupation
Icode25  =1 if iic=25 (Jute textiles)  2-digit industry  0.030  0.169
Icode29  =1 if iic=29 (Leather & Fur)  2-digit industry  0.015  0.122
Icode30  =1 if iic=30  2-digit industry  0.085  0.278
(Plastic & Petroleum)
Icode36  =1 if iic=36 (Electric Machinery)  2-digit industry  0.119  0.324
Icode37  =1 if iic=37  2-digit industry  0.140  0.347
(Transport Equipment)
Men  proportion of men  3-digit industry/  96.083  13.462
occupation
Unitsize  average unit size ('00s)  3-digit industry  2.289  4.609
Value  average value added per 1000  3-digit industry  57.190  64.231
workers, in 1990 Rupees
South  =1 if share of workers  3-digit industry  0.117  0.321
in south > 40 %
Nwest  =1 if share of workers  3-digit industry  0.021  0.142
in northwest > 40%
East  =1 if share of workers  3-digit industry  0.075  0.263
in east>  40 %
West  =1 if share of workers  3-digit industry  0.147  0.354
in west > 40 %
Public  Proportion of workers in  2-digit industry  0.274  0.146
government-operated industries
Dispute  average length  of industrial  2-digit industry  1.488  2.320
disputes per  1,000 mandays
Quit  average turnover rate  2-digit industry  30.289  11.174
Notes:  Annual wage includes basic wage, dearness allowance, shift allowance, overtime,
housing allowance if applicable.
15The core model controls for occupation, the proportion of men and the proportion
of time-rated workers employed in an occupation/industry cell.  It also includes indicator
variables to control for shift allowances and overtime allowances, and includes average
value added per worker. The 455 occupation dummies control for differences in required
skill and education levels for each job.  The proportion of men attempts to control for
wage differentials between male and female workers: Occupations employing a higher
proportion of men presumably will pay higher wages all else equal. The presence of shift
allowances and overtime allowances are used as indicators of the pleasantness of the job.
If shift allowances and overtime allowances are paid, this may indicate that the job
requires long hours of work at less convenient and desirable times of the day. The
average value added per worker, on the other hand, acts as a proxy for worker
productivity. The model also controls for the average size of establishments in the
industry.
The second model, in addition to the variables listed above, controls for the region
in which the industry is concentrated, to account for any differences in cost of living or
other geographical factors that could influence  wages.9 The indicator variable for a
region equals one if 40 percent or more of the workers employed in an industry are
located in the region in question.
The third and final specification incorporates several other variables reported at
the two-digit industrial classification level including the proportion of workers employed
9 The regions were defined according to specifications provided in Hanson and
Lieberman's India:Poverty, Employment and Social Services, 1989.
16in government-operated factories (vs. privately owned and operated), the average length
of industrial disputes in man-days, and the average turnover rate in the industry.  While
one would expect that workers employed in government-operated factories enjoy more
job security, workers employed in such firms may in return earn lower wages than those
employed in private companies for the same work.  The average length of labor disputes
in an industry acts as an imperfect proxy for the strength of the unions. Reliable
information on union membership was not available. Finally, we added the average
turnover rate to the model to control for the fact that new hires at a factory are likely to
earn less than workers with more tenure.  The higher the rate of turnover, the lower the
average tenure and the lower the average wage.
In each of the specifications described above, we have attempted to control for
inter-industry differentials by incorporating several industry dummy variables.  However,
given that the injury data are available only at the two-digit level and that the scope of
this analysis extends to manufacturing industries only, it is impossible to control for all
industries.
In order to select dummy variables for the most influential industries, we first
regressed the wage on the full set of industry dummy variables as well as other
occupation characteristics, using weighted least squares. Those industry dummies that
were significant at the 99.9 percent level were then incorporated into the hedonic wage
equation.  The results for this initial regression are reported in Table 4.
The three specifications of the hedonic wage equation described above were
estimated for each of two measures of fatal and non-fatal injury risk.  The first uses the
17Table 4: WLS+  Regression Results for Selection of Industry Dummies
(Dependent Variable: Log Wage; Occupation Dummies Absorbed)
Variable Name  Coefficient  St. Error  Pr > ITI
FOOD PRODUCTS  -0.004  0.099  0.9709
TOBACCO & TOBACCO  0.354**  0.159  0.0260
PRODUCTS
COTTON TEXTILES  0.211**  0.104  0.0424
WOOL, SILK & SYNTHETIC  0.255**  0.097  0.0088
TEXTILES
JUTE, HEMP & MESTA  8.380**  1.908  0.0001
TEXTILES
TEXTILE PRODUCTS  -0.094  0.111  0.3977
PAPER & PAPER PRODUCTS  0.216**  0.104  0.0381
LEATHER & FUR PRODUCTS  0.446**  0.122  0.0003
RUBBER, PLASTIC,  0.442**  0.096  0.0001
PETROLEUM & COAL
CHEMICAL & CHEMICAL  0.223  0.125  0.0754
PRODUCTS
NON-METALLIC MINERAL  0.255**  0.103  0.0132
PRODUCTS
BASIC METAL & ALLOYS  0.160  0.095  0.0927
INDUSTRIES
MACHINERY & MACHINE  0.139  0.101  0.1685
TOOLS
ELECTRICAL MACHINERY &  0.421**  0.094  0.0001
APPLIANCES
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT &  0.406**  0.094  0.0001
PARTS
MEN  0.005**  0.001  0.0001
UNITSIZE  0.1412**  0.028  0.0001
UNITSIZE*UNITSIZE  -0.016**  0.004  0.0001
AVGVALD  0.003**  0.0004  0.0001
CONSTANT  8.724**  0.116  0.0001
Notes:  +Weight=number of workers employed in occupation-industry cell.
**  Indicates significance at 95% level of confidence.
18fatal and non-fatal injury rates in the year preceding the collection of wage data in the
OWS.  The second uses the average of the injury rates from the five years preceding the
OWS.
V.  Discussion
A.  Regression Results
The results for all six model specifications are provided in Table 5.  The signs of
the coefficients of most variables generally agree with what has been reported in the
literature.  In all six specifications, occupations with a higher proportion of men pay more
than those employing more women. Workers in large firms earn more than those working
in small firms, but at a decreasing rate.  Workers are also rewarded for higher
productivity as evidenced by the positive (and statistically significant) coefficient on the
value-added variable.  Wages are higher in occupations that offer shift allowances and/or
overtime allowances, perhaps to compensate workers for unpleasant working conditions.
Region also seems to play a significant  role in determining the wage although not as we
had first anticipated.  The region concentration variables were introduced into the
equation primarily to account for cost-of-living differences across the country.  Instead, it
appears that they are capturing a different phenomenon. By construction, the regional
concentration variable equals one if 40 percent or more of the employees in the industry
are located in the region in question.  The negative coefficients we obtained for every
region suggest that, when an industry is concentrated in a region, firms in the industry
19Table 5:  WLS+  Regression Results for Six Model Speciflcations
(Dependent  Variable:  Log  Annual  Wage;  Standard  Errors  in Parentheses)
Variable  Risk From Previous Year  Five-year Average Risk
Name  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model I  Model 2  Model 3
Constant  8.410**  8.468**  8.269**  8.480**  8.563**  8.262**
________________  (0.634)  (0.568)  (0.574)  (0.640)  (0.581)  (0.579)
Fatal  0.430**  0.684**  0.747**  0.318  0.324  0.601*
(0.1300)  (0.124)  (0.145)  (0.275)  (0.255)  (0.330)
Nonfatal  0.0023**  0.002**  0.004**  0.002**  0.001*  *  0.006**
(0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.001)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.001)
Time  0.001**  -0.0004  -0.001  0.001**  -0.0003  -0.001
(0.0005)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)
Overtime  0.105**  0.059**  0.063**  0.084**  0.066**  0.071**
(0.024)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.025)
Shift  0.033  0.044**  0.040**  0.045**  0.049**  0.044**
(0.022)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.021)
Icode25  6.861**  9.312**  10.311**  4.928**  6.928**  9.503**
(Jute)  (1.535)  (1.485)  (1.705)  (1.514)  (1.522)  (1.709)
Icode29  0.385**  0.356**  0.326**  0.361**  0.316**  0.314**
(Leather)  (0.083)  (0.076)  (0.079)  (0.086)  (0.079)  (0.079)
Icode30  0.268**  0.361**  0.394**  0.246**  0.326**  0.392**
(Rubber)  (0.034)  (0.033)  (0.038)  ((0.034)  .034)  (0.039)
Icode36  0.329**  0.393**  0.429**  0.282**  0.307**  0.362**
(Elec. Mach.)  (0.037)  (0.035)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.040)
Icode37  0.264**  0.358**  0.378**  0.248**  0.333**  0.242**
(Transport)  (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.059)  (0.036)  (0.032)  (0.085)
Men  0.006**  0.007**  0.008**  0.006**  0.008**  0.007**
_____________  (0.001)  (0.001 )  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
Unitsize  0.118**  0.135**  0.149**  0.081**  0.090**  0.126**
_______________  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.025)  (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.025)
(Unitsize)^2  -0.014**  -0.018**  -0.020**  -0.010**  -0.013**  -0.017**
________________  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)
Value  0.004**  0.003**  0.002**  0.004**  0.003**  0.003**
_______________  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)
South  -0.171**  -0.202**  -0.137**  -0.180**
(0.030)  (0.031)  (0.030)  (0.031)
Nwest  -0.736**  -0.757**  -0.734**  -0.751**
(_________  0.052)  (0.052)  (0.053)  (0.053)
East  -0.169**  -0.275**  -0.089**  -0.214**
(__________  0.034)  (0.045)  (0.033)  (0.045)
West  -0.034  -0.047  -0.025  -0.033
(0.023)  (0.026)  (0.024)  (0.026)
Public  -0.223  -0.162
(0.134)  (0.150)
Dispute  -0.022  -0.077**
(0.014)  (0.020)
Quit  0.001  0.001
________________  ___ _______ __________  _  (0.001)  _(0.002)
Notes:  +Weight=number  of workers  in occupation-industry  cell.
**Indicates  significance  at the  95%  level of confidence  and  * at the 90%  level.
Coefficients  for Occupation  Dummies  omitted.
20have monopsony power or are selecting locations strategically to take advantage of low
labor costs.
As expected, government ownership of firms reduces wages, as do longer labor
disputes. The effect of the average turnover rate, on the other hand, is positive, an
unexpected sign, although not statistically significant. Judging from the significance of
the industry dummy variables, inter-industry wage differentials appear to be an important
determinant of wages as well.
Finally, turning to the effects of the fatal and non-fatal injury rates, risk of injury
and risk of death on the job positively influence  the wage.  This holds true in all
specifications of the model; however, only the coefficients using the previous period's
injury and mortality rates as the risk measures produce statistically significant results.
This lack of statistical significance is not surprising, however, since averaging the risk
variables over five years reduces the variation in the risk measure across industries and
thus increases the standard errors of the risk coefficients. The fact that the magnitudes of
the coefficients are similar across definitions of risk, however, is indicative of the
robustness of the results.
B.  Value of Life Estimates
Since the compensating wage differentials obtained from studies like this are used
to value improvements in risk of death and/or injury, it is interesting to convert these
estimates to Values of a Statistical Life (VSL) and Values of a Statistical Injury (VSI) for
comparison to other studies.  According to our models, the VSL, when evaluated at the
21mean wage, ranges between Rs. 6,417,341 and Rs. 15,040,642 (1990 Rupees).10 The
VSI, on the other hand, ranges between Rs. 20,054 and Rs. 120,325 (1990 Rupees).  At
current exchange rates ($1 US =  42 Rs.) the VSL for India ranges between US $153,000
and US $358,000, while the VSI ranges between US $477  and US $2,870.
In judging whether these results are reasonable, it is important that the Indian
VSL values be compared to foregone earnings. For the workers in our sample, the
present value of foregone earnings is Rs. 313,000.  This implies a ratio of VSL to
foregone earnings of 20 to 48-much  higher than the range implied by Moore and
Viscusi (1988) of 8 to 23 for theU.S.
Two factors could explain this result.  One is that Indian workers are more risk
averse than U.S. workers.  A number of studies examine consumption-saving decisions
and the degree of risk aversion for the U.S. population.  The values of the relative risk
aversion index ( p ) that have emerged from this literature range between 1 and 7
(Laibson, 1998 and Heal, 1998). In contrast, very few studies examine the issue of risk
aversion in developing countries.  One study does provide some estimates of risk
aversion for India, although in a much different context.  Binswanger (1980) empirically
estimates risk aversion among farmers in India from data on their investment decisions.
His value of p,  equal to 1.5, does not, however, adequately explain the discrepancy in
the ratios.
1°The VSL estimates are calculated by multiplying the coefficient on risk of
fatality by the annual wage rate.  This is then multiplied by 10,000 (the denominator of
our risk measure).
22An alternate and more satisfying explanation is that the income elasticity of the
VSL is less than one, implying that VSL/Y rises as income falls. Empirical estimates of
WTP to avoid illness suggest that the income elasticity of WTP to avoid illness is well
below 1.11
C.  Implications for Benefits Transfer
The fact that the ratio of VSL to income is higher in India that in the U.S.
suggests that traditional approaches for transferring VSL estimates from the U.S. to India
are likely to underestimate the VSL in India.  If, following equation (3), one multiplies
foregone earnings for India (Rs. 313,000) by the ratio of the VSL to foregone earnings in
the U.S. (8.63-25.2), the predicted VSL for India ranges from approximately 2.7 to 7.9
miillion  rupees, much smaller than our estimates of 6.4 to 15 million rupees.
VI.  Conclusions
The estimates of compensating wage differentials that we obtain from the OWS
imply a Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) in India of 6.4 to 15 million rupees (1990
rupees.).  This number is between 20 and 48 times forgone earnings-the  human capital
measure of the value of reducing risk of death.  While the ratio of the VSL to foregone
earnings implied by our study is large by comparison with studies in the U.S., it is much
For example, Loehman and De (1982) find an income elasticity ranging
between 0.26 and 0.60 in their study of the willingness to pay among respondents in
Tampa, Florida to avoid respiratory symptoms associated with air pollution.  Alberini et
al. (1997) find an income elasticity of WTP to avoid illness of 0.45 in a simnilar  study
conducted in Taiwan.
23smaller than the ratio implied by Shanmugam's study of compensating wage differentials
in the Indian labor market, which implies a ratio of 73!
While we believe that our estimates of compensating wage differentials are
robust, there remains the important question of whether these estimates should be used to
value risk reductions achieved by public health and safety programs in India.  To use
these estimates one must believe, as the theory in section II implies, that a worker's
willingness to accept compensation (WTA) for a small risk increase equals what he
would pay (WTP) to avoid the same risk decrease.  One must also believe that the
worker's preferences are representative of those of the randomly chosen Indian citizen.
There are researchers who question the notion that compensating wage
differentials in the labor market measure what citizens would be willing to pay, out of
their own pocket, for risk reductions.  Garber and Phelps (1977), for example, appeal to
the fact that, when the risk-reducing intervention is of a public good nature (e.g., reducing
ambient air pollution) it may be a poor substitute for private goods.  Under these
circumstances, as Hanemann (1991) has shown, willingness  to accept compensation (for
a risk increase) can be orders of magnitude larger than willingness to pay (for a risk
decrease).
In addition, preliminary results of pre-tests of a survey instrument to estimate
WTP for risk reductions by Krupnick et al. (1998) support Garber and Phelps'
conclusion.  In pre-tests of their questionnaire in the U.S. and Japan, Krupnick et al. find
the amount that people will pay for a medical intervention to reduce their risk of dying
24over the next ten years is substantially less than wage differentials for comparable risk
reductions in the labor market.
Given these findings, we believe that policymakers should exercise caution in
utilizing any compensating wage estimates, including those presented here, to value
reductions in risk of death associated with public health and safety programs.  These
values, however, may be viewed as upper bound estimates of WTP for risk reductions,
just as foregone earnings may be viewed as lower bound estimates of the value of risk
reductions.
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